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Abstract. Bitcoin’s Lightning Network (LN) is a scalability solution for
Bitcoin allowing transactions to be issued with negligible fees and set-
tled instantly at scale. In order to use LN, funds need to be locked in
payment channels on the Bitcoin blockchain (Layer-1) for subsequent use
in LN (Layer-2). LN is comprised of many payment channels forming a
payment channel network. LN’s promise is that relatively few payment
channels already enable anyone to efficiently, securely and privately route
payments across the whole network. In this paper, we quantify the struc-
tural properties of LN and argue that LN’s current topological properties
can be ameliorated in order to improve the security of LN, enabling it to
reach its true potential.
Keywords: Bitcoin · Lightning Network · Network Security · Network
Topology · Payment Channel Network · Network Robustness.
Since its launch, Bitcoin [7] gained a huge popularity due to its publicly verifiable,
decentralized, permissionless and censorship-resistant nature. This tremendous
popularity and increasing interest in Bitcoin pushed its network’s throughput to
its limits. Without further advancements, the Bitcoin network can only settle 7
transactions per second (tps), while mainstream centralized payment providers
such as Visa and Mastercard can process approximately 40,000 tps in peak hours.
Moreover one might need to pay large transaction fees on the Bitcoin network,
while also need to wait 6 new blocks (∼ 1 hour) to be published in order to be
certain enough that the transaction is included in the blockchain.
To alleviate these scalability issues the Lightning Network (LN) was designed
in 2016 [8], and launched in 2018, January. The main insight of LN is that
transactions can be issued off-blockchain in a trust-minimized manner achiev-
ing instant transaction confirmation times with negligible fees, whilst retain-
ing the security of the underlying blockchain. Bidirectional payment channels
can be formed on-chain using a construction called Hashed Timelock Contracts
(HTLC). Later several payments can take place in a payment channel. The main
advantage of payment channels is that one can send and receive thousands of
payments with essentially only 2 on-chain transations: the opening and closing
channel transactions.
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Using these payment channels as building blocks one might establish a pay-
ment channel network, where it is not necessary to have direct payment chan-
nels between nodes to transact with each other, but they could simply route
their payments through other nodes’ payment channels. Such a network can be
built, because LN achieves payments to be made without any counterparty risk,
however efficient and privacy-preserving payment routing remains a challenging
algorithmic task [9].
Our contributions. We empirically measure1 and describe LN’s topology
and show how robust it is against both random failures and targeted attacks.
These findings suggest that LN’s topology can be ameliorated in order to achieve
its true potential.
1 Background on Lightning Network
In this section we provide a short recap on how LN works. In the following we
will use the terms Layer-2 and off-chain interchangeably. LN is a so-called Layer-
2 technology, which allows participants issuing transactions without sending a
Layer-1 transaction on the Bitcoin parent chain. All parties cooperatively open
a channel by locking collateral on the blockchain. The funds can only be released
by unanimous agreement or through a pre-defined refund condition [3]. One of
the greatest challenge of Layer-2 technologies is to solve how participants can
agree on new state updates in a trustless or trust-minimized manner.
Let’s take the following toy example: Alice and Bob creates by a single Layer-
1 transaction a payment channel with initial balances 10B and 0B respectively.
Straightaway Alice can issue off-chain transactions to Bob up to 10B. Let’s
assume Alice issued 3 off-chain transactions to Bob each worth of 1B. Afterwards
Alice’s and Bob’s balance should be 7B and 3B and neither Alice, nor Bob should
be able to redeem previous balances on the parent chain. LN achieves this by
a replace by revocation mechanism, namely both parties collectively authorize
a new state before revoking the previous state. Upon dispute, the blockchain
provides a time period for parties to prove that the published state is a revoked
state [3]. Revoking old channel states is achieved by the exchange of revocation
secrets. These secrets, hash preimages, are needed to be retained during the
channel’s lifetime. A penalty mechanism discourages parties from broadcasting
older states. If one party broadcasts a revoked state, the blockchain accepts
within a time-window proofs of maleficence from the other party. A successful
dispute allots the winning party all coins of the channel. In our example if Alice
broadcasts a revoked channel state with balances 8B and 2B, Bob can prove, that
Alice maliciously broadcasted a revoked state. The penalty mechanism grants
all the 10B to Bob.
The great insight of LN, is that if now Alice would like to issue a payment to
Cecily, who eventually has already established a payment channel to Bob, then
Alice does not need to open a payment channel and create a costly on-chain
1 https://github.com/seresistvanandras/LNTopology
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transaction, rather she can route her payment through her payment channel
with Bob to Cecily. However the maximum amount of bitcoins Alice can send to
Cecily is the minimum of all the individual balances on the payment route from
Alice to Cecily. Hashed time-locked contracts (HTLC) enable routed payments
to be atomic. For a technical description of HTLCs and multi-hop payments the
astute reader is referred to [8].
In the following we will model LN as an undirected, weighted graph, where
nodes are entities who can issue payments using payment channels which are
the edges of the LN graph. The weight on the edges, capacities, are the sum of
individual balances. Note, that in most cases individual balances are not known
to outsiders. Only the capacity of a payment channel is public information,
however one can effectively assess individual balances with handy algorithms [4].
2 Lightning Network’s Topology
Number of nodes 2344
Number of payment channels 16617
Average degree 7.0891
Connected components 2
Density 0.00605
Total BTC held in LN 543.61855B
s-metric 0.6878
Maximal independent set 1564
Bridges 530
Diameter 6
Radius 3
Mean shortest path 2.80623
Transitivity 0.1046
Average clustering coefficient 0.304
Degree assortativity −0.2690
Fig. 1: LN at a glance: basic properties of
the LN graph.
LN can be described as a weighted
graph G = (V,E), where V is the
set of LN nodes and E is the set of
bidirectional payment channels be-
tween these nodes. We took a snap-
shot2 of LN’s topology on the 10th
birthday of Bitcoin, 2019 January
3rd. In the following we are going
to analyze this dataset. Although
the number of nodes and payment
channels are permanently changing
in LN, we observed through sev-
eral snapshots that the main topo-
logical characteristics (density, av-
erage degree, transitivity, nature of
degree distribution) remained un-
changed. We leave it for future
work to analyze the dynamic prop-
erties of LN.
LN gradually increased adop-
tion and attraction throughout
2018, which resulted in 3 independent client implementations (c-lightning3,
eclair4 and lnd5) and 2344 nodes joining LN as of 2019, January 3rd. The density
of a graph is defined as D = 2|E||V ||V−1| which is the ratio of present and potential
edges. As it is shown in Figure 1. LN is quite a sparse graph. This is further
justified by the fact that LN has 530 bridges, edges which deletion increases the
2 https://graph.lndexplorer.com
3 https://github.com/ElementsProject/lightning/
4 https://github.com/ACINQ/eclair
5 https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd
4 I.A. Seres et al.
number of connected components. Although LN consists of 2 components, the
second component has only 3 nodes. The low transitivity, fraction of present and
possible triangles in the graph, highlights the sparseness of LN as well.
Fig. 2: LN’s degree distribution
Negative degree as-
sortativity of the graph
indicates that on av-
erage low degree nodes
tend to connect to
high degree nodes rather
than low degree nodes.
Such a dissortative
property hints a hub
and spoke network
structure, which is
also reflected in the
degree distribution, see
Figure 2.
Average shortest
path length is 2.80623,
without taking into
account capacities of
edges, which signals
that payments can easily be routed with a few hops throughout the whole net-
work. Although this is far from being a straightforward task, since one also needs
to take into consideration the capacity of individual payment channels along a
candidate path.
When a new node joins LN, it needs to select which other nodes it is trying to
connect to. In the lnd LN implementation key goals for a node is to optimize its
centrality by connecting to central nodes. This phenomena sets up a preferential
attachment pattern. Other LN implementations rely on their users to create
channels manually, which also most likely leads to users connecting to high-
degree nodes. Betweenness centrality of a node v is given by the expression
g(v) =
∑
s 6=v 6=t
σst(v)
σst
, where σst is the total number of shortest paths between
node s and t, whilst σst(v) is the number of those paths, that pass through v.
Closeness centrality of a node v is defined as CC(u) = N∑
u6=v d(u,v)
, where N is
the number of nodes in the graph and d(u, v) is the distance between node u
and v. Closeness centrality measures how close a node is to all other nodes.
Small-world architectures, like LN, exhibit high clustering with short path
lenghts. The appropriate graph theoretic tool to asses clustering is the clustering
coefficient [11]. Local clustering coefficient measures how well a node’s neighbors
are connected to each other, namely how close they are to being a clique. If a
node u has deg(u) neighbors, then between these deg(u) neighbors could be at
maximum 12deg(u)(deg(u) − 1) edges. If N(u) denotes the set of u’s neighbors,
then the local clustering coefficient is defined as C(u) = 2|(v,w):v,w∈N(u)∧(v,w)∈E|deg(u)(deg(u)−1) .
Topological Analysis of Bitcoin’s Lightning Network 5
LN’s local clustering coefficient distribution suggestively captures that LN is
essentially comprised of a small central clique and a loosely connected periphery.
2.1 Analysis of LN’s degree distribution
Fig. 3: Local clustering coefficient of LN
LN might exhibit scale-
free properties as the
s-metric suggests. S-
metric was first in-
troduced by Lun Li
et al. in [5] and
defined as s(G) =∑
(u,v)∈E deg(u)deg(v).
The closer to 1 s-
metric of G is, the
more scale-free the
network. Diameter and
radius of LN sug-
gest that LN is a
small world. Some-
what scale-freeness is
also exhibited in the
degree distribution of
LN. Majority of nodes have very few payment channels, although there are a few
hubs who have significantly more connections as it can be seen in Figure 2. The
scale-freeness of LN is further justified also by applying the method introduced
in [2]. The maximum-likelihood fitting asserted that the best fit for the empir-
ical degree distribution is a power law function with exponent γ = −2.1387.
The goodness-of-fit of the scale-free model was ascertained by the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov statistic. We found that the p-value of the scale-free hypothesis is
p = 0.8172, which is accurate within 0.01. Therefore the scale-free hypothesis is
plausible for the empirical degree distribution of LN.
3 Robustness of LN
It is a major question in network science how robust a given network is. LN,
just like Bitcoin, is a permissionless network, where nodes can join and leave
arbitrarily at any point in time. Nodes can also create new payment channels
or close them any time. Furthermore as new payments are made, capacities of
payment channels are changing steadily. Despite the dynamic nature of LN, its
topology’s characteristics remain constant after all. In this section we investigate
how resilient LN is, whether it can effectively withhold random node failures or
deliberate attacks.
Measuring robustness means that one gradually removes nodes and/or edges
from the graph, until the giant component is broken into several isolated compo-
nents. The fraction of nodes that need to be removed from a network to break it
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into multiple isolated connected components is called the percolation threshold
and is denoted as fc. In real networks percolation threshold can be well estimated
by the point where the giant component first drops below 1% of its original size
[1].
3.1 Random Failures
Network fc
Internet 0.92
WWW 0.88
US Power Grid 0.61
Mobil Phone Call 0.78
Science collaboration 0.92
E. Coli Metabolism 0.96
Yeast Protein Interactions 0.88
LN 0.96
Fig. 4: Random failures in net-
works. Values of critical thresh-
olds for other real networks are
taken from [1].
Random failures are a realistic attack vector
for LN. If nodes happen to be off-line due to
bad connections or other reasons, they can
not participate in routing payments anymore.
Such a failure can be modeled as if a node and
its edges are removed from the graph.
For scale-free networks with degree dis-
tribution Pk = k
−γ , where 2 < γ < 3 the
percolation threshold can be calculated by
applying the Molloy-Reed criteria, ie. fc =
1− 1γ−2
3−γ k
γ−2
mink
3−γ
max−1 , where kmin and kmax de-
note the lowest and highest degree nodes re-
spectively. This formula yields fc = 0.9797
for LN in case of random failures. This value
is indeed close to the percolation threshold
measured by network simulation as shown in
Figure 4, that is, LN provides an evidence of topological stability under random
failures. In particular this is due to the fact that in LN a randomly selected node
is unlikely to affect the network as a whole, since an average node is not sig-
nificantly contributing to the network’s topological connectivity, see also degree
distribution at Figure 2.
3.2 Targeted attacks
Targeted attacks on LN nodes are also a major concern as the short history of LN
has already shown it. On 2018 March 21st 6, 20% of nodes were down due to a
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack against LN nodes. Denial of Service
(DoS) attacks are also quite probable by flooding HTLCs. These attack vectors
are extremely harmful, especially if they are coordinated well. One might expect
that not only state-sponsored attackers will have the resources to attack a small
network like LN. In the first attack scenario we removed 30 highest-degree nodes
one by one starting with the most well-connected one and gradually withdraw
the subsequent high-degree nodes. We recorded the number of connected com-
ponents. As it is shown in Figure 5. even just removing the highest-degree node7
fragments the LN graph into 37 connected components! Altogether the removal
of the 30 largest hubs incurs LN to collapse into 424 components, although most
6 https://www.trustnodes.com/2018/03/21/lightning-network-ddos-sends-20-nodes
7 http://rompert.com/
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of these are isolated vertices. This symptom can be explained by the experienced
dissortativity, namely hubs tend to be at the periphery.
Fig. 5: LN’s vertex connectivity, when all
the 30 largest hubs are removed one by
one
Fig. 6: LN’s vertex connectivity if only
one high-degree node is removed from
the graph.
We reasserted the targeted attack scenario, but for the second time we only
removed one of the 30 largest hubs and recorded the number of connected com-
ponents. As it can be seen in Figure 6 most of the hubs, 25, would leave behind
several disconnected components.
Network fc
Internet 0.16
WWW 0.12
Facebook 0.28
Euroroad 0.59
US Power Grid 0.20
Mobil Phone Call 0.20
Science collaboration 0.27
E. Coli Metabolism 0.49
Yeast Protein Interactions 0.16
LN 0.14
Fig. 7: Real networks under tar-
geted attacks. Values of criti-
cal thresholds for other real net-
works are taken from [1] and [6].
Such network fragmentations are un-
wanted in case of LN, because they would
make payment routing substantially more
challenging (one needs to split the payment
over several routes) or even impossible (there
would be no routes at all).
Furthermore we estimated the percolation
threshold by simulating two attacking strate-
gies. In the first scenario we removed high de-
gree nodes one by one (high degree removal
attack, HDR) and in the second we removed
nodes with the highest betweenness central-
ity (high betweenness removal attack, HBR).
Note that in both cases after each node re-
moval we recalculated which node has the
highest degree or betweenness centrality in
order to have a more powerful attack. We
found out that fc = 0.1627 for removing
high degree nodes, while for removing high
betweenness centrality nodes fc = 0.1409, therefore choosing to remove high be-
tweenness centrality nodes is a better strategy as it can also be seen in Figure 10.
Node outage not only affects robustness and connectivity properties, but also
affects average shortest path lengths and available liquidity. Although the outage
of random nodes does not significantly increase the average shortest path lengths
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Fig. 8: High degree removal (HDR)
attack effects average shortest path
lengths Fig. 9: Lost capacity as removing high-
degree nodes
in LN, targeted attacks against hubs increase distances between remaining nodes.
The spillage of high-degree nodes not only decreases the amount of available
liquidity but also rapidly increases the necessary hops along payment routes as
Figure 8 and 9 suggest. This could cause increased ratio of failed payments
due to larger payment routes and sparser liquidity. Figure 9 demonstrates how
capital allocation is centred upon a few high degree nodes, namely already the
removal of as few nodes as 37 decreases the available liquidity by more than 50%.
Unfortunately most of these nodes are run by a handful of companies.
Fig. 10: Percolation thresholds for various attack scenarios: fHDRc = 0.1627,
fHBRc = 0.1409, f
RND
c = 0.9645
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3.3 Improving LN’s resilience against random failures and attacks
Designing networks which are robust to random failures and targeted attacks
appear to be a conflicting desire [1]. For instance a star graph, the simplest hub
and spoke network, is resilient to random failures. The removal of any set of
spokes does not hurt the connectedness of the main component. However it can
not withstand a targeted attack against its central node, since it would leave
behind isolated spokes. Furthermore when one attempts increasing robustness
of a network, they do desire not to decrease the connectivity of nodes.
A similar optimization strategy of robustness and connectivity to that of [10]
could be applied to LN as well. We leave it for future work to empirically assess
the robustness and connectivity gains if the strategy of [10] would be imple-
mented in LN client implementations.
Nonetheless, we can still enhance the network’s attack tolerance by connect-
ing its peripheral nodes [1]. This could be achieved by LN client implementations
by implicitly mandating newcomers to connect to not only hubs, as current im-
plementations do, but also to at least a few random nodes.
4 Conclusion
In summary, a better understanding of the network topology is essential for im-
proving the robustness of complex systems, like LN. Networks’ resilience depends
on their topology. LN is well approximated by the scale-free model and also its
attack tolerance properties are similar to those of scale-free networks; in partic-
ular, while LN is robust against random failures, it is quite vulnerable in the
face of targeted attacks. High-level depictions of LN’s topology convey a false
image of security and robustness. As we have demonstrated, LN is structurally
weak against rational adversaries. Thus, to provide robust Layer-2 solutions for
blockchains, such as LN and Raiden, the community needs to aim at building
resilient network topologies.
Acknowledgements. We are grateful for the insightful comments and dis-
cussions to Chris Buckland, Daniel Goldman, Olaoluwa Osuntokun and Alex
Bosworth. Furthermore we are thankful for Altangent Labs8 for providing us
the invaluable data. The research at Eo¨tvo¨s Lora´nd University was partially
supported by the European Union, co-financed by the European Social Fund
(EFOP-3.6.2-16-2017-00012).
8 https://www.blocktap.io/
10 I.A. Seres et al.
References
1. Baraba´si, A.L., et al.: Network science. Cambridge university press (2016)
2. Clauset, A., Shalizi, C.R., Newman, M.E.: Power-law distributions in empirical
data. SIAM review 51(4), 661–703 (2009)
3. Gudgeon, L., Moreno-Sanchez, P., Roos, S., McCorry, P., Gervais, A.: Sok: Off the
chain transactions. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2019/360 (2019), https:
//eprint.iacr.org/2019/360
4. Herrera-Joancomarti, J., Navarro-Arribas, G., Ranchal-Pedrosa, A., Pe´rez-Sola,
C., Garcia-Alfaro, J.: On the difficulty of hiding the balance of lightning network
channels. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2019/328 (2019), https://eprint.
iacr.org/2019/328
5. Li, L., Alderson, D., Doyle, J.C., Willinger, W.: Towards a theory of scale-free
graphs: Definition, properties, and implications. Internet Mathematics 2(4), 431–
523 (2005)
6. Lin, Y., Chen, W., Zhang, Z.: Assessing percolation threshold based on high-order
non-backtracking matrices. In: Proceedings of the 26th International Conference
on World Wide Web. pp. 223–232. International World Wide Web Conferences
Steering Committee (2017)
7. Nakamoto, S.: Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system (2008)
8. Poon, J., Dryja, T.: The bitcoin lightning network: Scalable off-chain instant pay-
ments. See https://lightning. network/lightning-network-paper. pdf (2016)
9. Roos, S., Moreno-Sanchez, P., Kate, A., Goldberg, I.: Settling payments fast and
private: Efficient decentralized routing for path-based transactions. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1709.05748 (2017)
10. Shargel, B., Sayama, H., Epstein, I.R., Bar-Yam, Y.: Optimization of robustness
and connectivity in complex networks. Physical review letters 90(6), 068701 (2003)
11. Watts, D.J., Strogatz, S.H.: Collective dynamics of ‘small-world’networks. nature
393(6684), 440 (1998)
